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I. INTRODUCTION
With end of the Bush administration, attention has turned to
prosecution of Bush-era officials for international crimes, including war
crimes and torture. At the same time, a new administration has begun,
offering new possibilities. I will, for the most part, leave the discussion
concerning prosecution of former Bush administration officials to my
colleagues, and turn instead to consideration of issues around prosecuting
in the U.S. those who have committed international crimes abroad, such
as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, and forced
disappearance.
Here are a couple of bookends to the issue:
In 2002, Amnesty International issued a report on safe haven for
torturers in the U.S. that said that over a thousand known torturers or war
criminals were then living in the U.S., and the U.S. government was not
doing much about it. ' The U.S., Amnesty complained, provided a nice
*. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Many
thanks to Menaka Fermando and Sarah Newby for their excellent research assistance..
I. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, U.S.: A SAFE HAVEN FOR TORTURE (2002).
www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/safehaven.pdf.
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retirement home for dictators and thugs.2
Fast forward to January 2009. Chuckie Taylor, Jr. , the son of
former Liberian strongman Charles Taylor, was convicted in a Miami
courtroom of torture and sentenced to 97 years in prison. A month later,
General Jos6 Guillermo Garcia, former Defense Minister of El Salvador,
was arrested on charges of immigration fraud for not revealing his role in
serious human rights violations during the 1980s.4
What has changed, and where is the U.S. going with respect to
dealing with the dictators and torturers in our midst? I will start with an
overview of which of the international "core crimes" are now
prosecutable under U.S. law, then look at a few emblematic cases, and
conclude with some thoughts on strategy for both the new administration
and human rights advocates.
II. WHAT CRIMES ARE PROSECUTABLE? 5
A. Genocide
The crime of genocide has been criminalized in U.S. law since
1988, but only where committed by U.S. citizens or in the U.S. In 2007,
the Genocide Accountability Act extended jurisdiction to legal
permanent residents and, most importantly, to any offender brought into
or found in U.S., even if the prohibited conduct occurred abroad. 6 The
2. Id.
3. Sometimes referred to as Charles Emmanuel or Chuckie Emmanuel. See id.
4. See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006). See also CENTER FOR JUSTICE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY, EL SALVADOR: CARLOS EUGENIO VIDES CASANOVA AND JOSE
GUILLERMO GARCIA, available at http://www.cja.org/cases/romagoza.shtml (last visited Nov.
8, 2009).
5. See generally Douglass Cassel, Empowering United States Courts to Hear Crimes
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 421 (2001);
Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human Rights Violators Accountable
by Using International Law in US. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary Strategies,
19 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 169 (2005).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2007). (The statute states in relevant part: (d) Required
circumstance for offenses. The circumstance . . . is that-(1) the offense is committed in
whole or in part within the United States; (2) the alleged offender is a national of the United
States (as that term is defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101)); (3) the alleged offender is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the
United States (as that term is defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101)); the alleged offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the
United States; or (5) after the conduct required for the offense occurs, the alleged offender is
brought into, or found in, the United States, even if that conduct occurred outside the United
States).
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definition of genocide follows that found in the 1948 Convention., It is
not clear exactly what the "brought into" language is about-it seems to
refer to capture abroad and/or extradition from elsewhere. The change
was apparently triggered by congressional debates and the
Administration's finding that genocide was occurring in Darfur.9
Despite this step forward, a few of the definitions in the statute
will make it extremely difficult, in practice, to prosecute genocide. For
example, "incite" is defined as "urges another to engage imminently in
conduct in circumstances under which there is a substantial likelihood of
imminently causing such conduct."9 Thus, if the prohibited conduct is
part of a long-term campaign it may not meet the imminence
requirement. Similarly, the Genocide Convention's requirement of an
intent to destroy in whole or in part has become a requirement to intend
to destroy "a part of a group of such numerical significance that the
destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group
as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part."' 0 This
requirement goes further than both the Convention itself and the current
jurisprudence of international tribunals on the subject, and raises the bar
for a prosecutor to an impossible height.
B. Torture
The Federal Criminal Torture Statute" gives U.S. courts
jurisdiction over cases involving torture committed outside the U.S.,
where the offender is a U.S. citizen, the offender is a resident of the U.S.,
or the offender is present in the U.S., regardless of his or her nationality
or where the acts took place. The law was passed as part of the package
of implementing legislation for the Convention Against Torture, which
7. Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-606, § 1091, 102
Stat. 3045 ((a) Basic offense. Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a
circumstance described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such (1) kills members of that
group; (2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group; (3) causes the permanent
impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture, or similar
techniques; (4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical
destruction of the group in whole or in part; (5) imposes measures intended to prevent births
within the group; or (6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; or attempts
to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b')
8. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR AND BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 11182, DOCUMENTING
ATROCITIES IN DARFUR (2004); Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan
Genocide, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at Al.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1093 (3) (2007).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1093 (8) (2007).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (1994).
[Vol. 17:80
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requires states to extradite or prosecute those found within their territory
as well as their own citizens accused of torture.12 For years after the law
passed, no prosecutions took place. Although human rights
organizations consistently submitted dossiers on suspected torturers
within the U.S. to the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Attorney General
refused to authorize prosecutions.
On October 30, 2008, Charles Taylor, Jr., a.k.a. Chuckie
Emmanuel, was the first person to be convicted under the Federal
Criminal Torture Statute.' 3 A jury convicted Taylor of torturing prisoners
when he was head of Liberia's anti-terrorist unit, otherwise known as
"Demon Forces." On March 30, 2006, Taylor was arrested when he
attempted to enter the U.S. with a passport obtained through false
documents from Trinidad. He pled guilty to the immigration violation on
Sept. 15, 2006 and was sentenced to 11 months in prison. During the
time he was imprisoned on this violation, various groups provided
information on his participation in torture, and the U.S. attorney's office
in Miami filed charges.
The Taylor conviction is a positive first step. But it does not
necessarily represent the application of a species of universal
jurisdiction, in that Taylor had U.S. citizenship and could have been
prosecuted even had there been no "present in the U.S." provision in the
statute.
C. War Crimes
The Federal Criminal War Crimes Statute' 4 reads: "(a)
Whoever, whether inside or outside the U.S., commits a war crime, in
any of the circumstances described in subsection (b), shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both, and if death
results to the victim, shall also be subject to the penalty of death." The
law only applies where the perpetrator or the victim is a member of the
armed forces of the U.S. or a national of the U.S. Substantively, it
covers grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, some violations of the
1907 Hague Conventions and prohibited ordinances. It also covers some
but not all violations of Common Article 3 (CA3) applicable to non-
international armed conflicts, but with restrictive "specific intent"
12. G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doe. A/39/51
(June 26, 1987).
13. Yolanne Almanzar, Son of Ex-President of Liberia is Convicted of Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, October 31, 2008 at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/31/us/3Itaylor.html.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2008).
2009] 83
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language added.
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 left intact sub-sections
(1), (2), and (4) penalizing the grave breaches of the Conventions, and
certain provisions of the Hague and Mines Conventions.' 5 It significantly
altered, however, the ability of the U.S. to prosecute violations of CA3.
Moreover, it substantively changes U.S. incorporation into domestic law
of Common Article 3 in ways that are intended to sharpen and clarify the
elements of the crimes, but does so in a way that at least arguably
narrows the prohibited conduct. For example, compare the Statute's
definition of cruel or inhuman treatment: "The act of a person who
commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an act intended to inflict
severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical
abuse, upon another within his custody or control." Compare this
language to that of Common Article 3 itself, which prohibits, in addition
to torture and cruel treatment "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment;"' 6
There have been no prosecutions to date under this section. It
deliberately does not extend to universal jurisdiction. The legislative
history states:
The State Department and Defense Department have recommended
that H.R. 3680 be amended to provide for universal jurisdiction which
would allow for criminal proceedings to be brought against a war
criminal for crimes taking place outside of the U.S. where neither the
victim nor perpetrator are American, as long as the perpetrator is
present in the United States . . . The Committee decided that the
expansion of H.R. 3680 to include universal jurisdiction would be
unwise at present. Domestic prosecution based on universal
jurisdiction could draw the United States into conflicts in which this
country has no place and where our national interests are slight. In
addition, problems involving witnesses and evidence would likely be
daunting. This does not mean that war criminals should go
unpunished. There are ample alternative venues available which are
more appropriate. Prosecutions can be handled by the nations involved
or by international tribunal. If a war criminal is discovered in the
United States, the federal government can extradite the individual
upon request in order to facilitate prosecution overseas. The
Committee is not presently aware that these alternative venues are
15. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a - 949s (2008).
16. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[Vol. 17:80
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inadequate to meet the task.17
D. Hostage Taking
In 1984, Congress enacted the hostage taking statute to implement
the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. The statute
provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, whoever,
whether inside or outside the United States, seizes or detains and
threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in
order to compel a third person or a governmental organization to do or
abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the person detained, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall
be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if
the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life
imprisonment.
(b)(1) It is not an offense under this section if the conduct required for
the offense occurred outside the United States unless-
(A) the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of the
United States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or
(C) the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the
Government of the United States.' 8
In U.S. v. Yunis, the court held that these provisions "reflect[] an
unmistakable congressional intent, consistent with treaty obligations of
the United States, to authorize prosecution of those who take Americans
hostage abroad no matter where the offense occurs or where the offender
is found."' 9 The court also found that customary international law
contains a "universal" principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
which a state can prosecute certain offenses recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern.2 0
E. Specific Crimes
Two new provisions were introduced into the William Wilberforce
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Dec. 23,
2008).21
17. H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2172.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (Supp. 112008).
19. 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.
2009] 85
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1.Recruitment of Child Soldiers
The Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 2442
(2008), punishes the recruitment of child soldiers (defined as under the
age of 15) for service in an armed force or group with twenty years to
life imprisonment.22 The law defines "armed force or group" as "any
army, militia, or other military organization, whether or not it is state-
sponsored." The law was a first product of the newly formed Senate
Sub-committee on Human Rights and the Law, chaired by Senator
Richard J. Durbin. Under the law, "[t]here is jurisdiction over an offense
described in subsection (a), and any attempt or conspiracy to commit
such offense, if-(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United
States . . . (2) the alleged offender is a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in the United States; (3) the alleged offender is present in the
United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender; or
(4) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States."23
The crime has a ten-year statute of limitations, and also constitutes an
immigration offense, making a perpetrator inadmissible and not eligible
for political asylum. By enacting this legislation, the U.S. is complying
with its obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,2 4 which was ratified in 2002.
2. Slavery and Trafficking in Persons
The Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2008, S. 1703
110th Cong., was introduced by Sen. Durbin on Jun. 27, 2007 and passed
the Senate on Oct. 1, 2008.25 It covers slavery and trafficking in persons.
It creates a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction allowing U.S.
prosecution when the offender is either a U.S. national or permanent
resident, or when the alleged offender is present in the U.S., irrespective
of nationality. The bill also makes clear that U.S. jurisdiction is
subsidiary to the jurisdiction of other states, at least to the extent that if
the case is being prosecuted elsewhere it can only be heard in the U.S.
with special DOJ approval. The language reads:
(Supp. I 2008)).
22. Pub. L. No. 110-340, 122 Stat. 3735 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
(Supp. 11 2008)).
23. Id
24. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (ratified by the United States
on December 23, 2002).
25. S. 1703. 1 10th Cong. (2008).
[Vol. 17:80
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Sec. 1596(b): No prosecution may be commenced against a person
under this section if a foreign government, in accordance with
jurisdiction recognized by the United States, has prosecuted or is
prosecuting such person for the conduct constituting such offense,
except upon the approval of the Attorney General or the Deputy
Attorney General (or a person acting in either such capacity), which
function of approval may not be delegated.
In addition to these recent legislative changes, Sen. Durbin also held
a hearing on June 24, 2008, on creating extraterritorial jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity. 26 A specific legislative proposal to that effect
was introduced on June 24, 2009 as Senate Bill 1346 and is still
pending. 27
III. ENFORCEMENT
Despite the new legislative efforts, enforcement of these laws
remains spotty. There are two agencies in the government tasked with
rooting out human rights violators in the U.S. In the Justice Department,
the Office of Special Investigations, formed to find and denaturalize
former Nazi war criminals, has merged with the Domestic Security
Section of the Department to form the Human Rights and Special
Prosecutions Section and expanded its purview to encompass naturalized
war criminals and human rights violators from other conflicts or
repressive regimes. 2 8 Within the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) branch of the Department of Homeland Security, the National
Security Investigations Division has a Human Rights Violators and War
Crimes Unit. Its stated mission is to "prevent the admission of foreign
war crimes suspects, persecutors and human rights abusers into the
United States [and] identify, prosecute and ultimately remove such
offenders who are already unlawfully in the United States." 29
There are five different enforcement mechanisms that can be used
to deal with human rights violators located within the U.S. First, they
26. From Nuremberg to Darfur: Accountability for Crimes Against Humanity: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. On Human Rights and the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 11Oth Cong.
786 (2008).
27. Crimes Against Humanity Act of 2010, S. 1346, 11Ith Cong. (as reported by S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, May 6, 2010).
28. ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND SPECIAL PROSECTIONS SECTION, available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/about/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
29. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS AND WAR CRIMES UNIT, HISTORY AND MISSION
available at http://www.ice.gov/investigations/nationalsecurity/hrv.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2010).
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can be subject to civil suits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and/or the
Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA). Second, they can be prosecuted
for the crimes listed above. Third, they can be arrested and deported if
they are in the country unlawfully. Fourth, they can be prosecuted for
immigration fraud or other immigration violations related to non-
disclosure of their participation in abuses. Fifth, they can be extradited
to another state that wants to prosecute them. It is the combination,
priority, and interaction among these mechanisms that provide the most
interesting possibilities going forward.
With respect to civil suits, they are discussed elsewhere, so I will
not go into detail here. However, it is important to stress that an
intersection exists between civil suits under the ATS and TVPA with the
other mechanisms I listed. For example, perpetrators come to the
attention of U.S. authorities often through civil suits against defendants
found in the U.S. that perpetrators come to the attention of U.S.
authorities. It is through the efforts of groups like the Center for Justice
and Accountability, the Center for Constitutional Rights, EarthRights
International and others that defendants are found, evidence collected,
and pressure brought to bear on authorities in the U.S. and elsewhere to
prosecute. The reluctance of prosecutors in the U.S. to move against
human rights violators has made civil suits not only the vehicle of choice
for victims, but the only way in which they can be the main protagonists
rather than simply potential witnesses in the case. In contrast, other
countries allow victims to intervene in the criminal process and obtain
damages after a criminal conviction in the U.S.
While there are many advantages to civil suits, deportation is
often the worst outcome with respect to human rights violators found in
the U.S. From the perspective of human rights advocates, alleged
perpetrators, if deported, have been sent to the one place where, at least
until recently, they were least likely to be held accountable either
criminally or civilly-their home state. After all, in many of these cases
the alleged perpetrators held positions of power, and in many post armed
conflict states the justice system still works imperfectly. True,
deportation does remove such people from immigrant communities
where they could encounter traumatized survivors, and it does serve as
punishment to some degree because the defendant no longer has the
option of U.S. medical care or a luxurious U.S. retirement. However, it
provides little access to information about the crime for victims, and
certainly neither reparation nor penal sanctions. It can deprive victims of
their chance to confront the defendant in civil court; even if they win a
default judgment; the (often remote) chance of finding assets is a poor
[Vol. 17:80
HeinOnline  -- 17 Willamette J. Int'l L. & Dis. Res. 88 2009
PROSECUTING CORE CRIMES
substitute.
The U.S. has recently determined a better way to deport violators.
In cases where there is communication with, and credible assurances
from, the violator's home country such that they will be prosecuted upon
return, the deporting authorities can arrange for representatives of the
local prosecutors' office to meet the deportee's plane upon arrival and
take him into custody. For example, Juan Rivera Rond6n is a former
army lieutenant accused of participation in the Accomarca massacre in
Peru in 1985. Rond6n was initially civilly sued by two survivors in civil
court, who were twelve years old at the time and witnessed the massacre
of family members. The Center for Justice and Accountability (CJA)
sent copies of some of the evidence against him to ICE. He was arrested
on immigration charges, but ICE held off deporting him until CJA could
put the authorities in contact with prosecutors in Lima. After he was
deported, prosecutors met his plane in Lima and immediately detained
him pending trial on criminal charges.
In addition to ensuring that prosecuting authorities in the home
country will follow up on allegations of human rights-related crimes,
ICE authorities might also consider timing deportation so that the
defendant can participate in the civil proceedings, if these have already
been filed. Immigration authorities might also consider earlier
communication with human rights lawyers and activists when they have
violators under investigation. Many lawyers and activists groups distrust
the immigration service precisely because they are seen as wanting to
deport prematurely, before arrangements can be made to ensure effective
investigations in the suspect's home country. Additionally, they are seen
as insisting on deportation rather than prosecution in the U.S., even when
it is clear that the home country has no interest in, or ability to,
prosecute.
Several treaties commit the U.S. to either extraditing or
prosecuting those suspected of crimes like torture and grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions. Prosecution is often the mechanism of choice
for victims, and also has clear expressive value in reaffirming global
norms prohibiting the crime and the U.S.' commitment to those norms.
The DOJ has been extremely reluctant to prosecute even clear-cut cases:
as mentioned, only one case has been brought to trial under section 2340,
the prohibition on torture, and that case arguably involved a U.S.
national. Over the last three years, a number of new laws allowing
prosecution of crimes committed abroad have come into effect, but they
will face the same problem that initially dogged the use of the torture
statute: the retrospective nature of its application. During the 1990s, the
892009]
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DOJ argued that it could not prosecute acts that took place before 1994
because that would require retroactive application of a criminal statute,
which would violate the principle of legality. This argument was not
supported in international law, which makes quite clear that there is no
ex post facto problem when the behavior at issue has been criminalized
in national or international law.30 We can expect the same arguments to
be raised now in cases involving genocide or child soldiers. It is not yet
clear whether the Obama administration will be more aggressive than its
predecessors in bringing prosecutions, but the incentives for prosecutors
already overburdened by local crime to pursue investigations that require
significant resources and expertise would seem to cut against any large-
scale prosecutions policy. The use of universal jurisdiction to investigate
wrongdoing by U.S. officials elsewhere might also end up dampening
prosecutors' enthusiasm for universal jurisdiction-based prosecutions at
home, lest they be seen as endorsing the principle.
U.S. official antipathy at least until recently, to the use of
universal jurisdiction might also complicate requests for extradition to
other countries for trial. These cases would not involve U.S. nationals
(whom the U.S. would almost certainly argue should be tried at home)
but rather nationals of other states wanted at home or by third countries.
Treaty obligations regarding torture and war crimes as well as many
terrorism-related crimes require the state where the defendant is found to
either extradite or prosecute, but don't specify which extraditing states.
For example, Spain is now investigating core crimes committed in El
Salvador and Guatemala. If a potential defendant in one of those cases
turns out to be located in the U.S., will the DOJ under the Obama
30. See, e.g., Art. 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force March 23, 1976, ratified by the U.S. Sept. 8, 1992,
which states in pertinent part that "[no] one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed." See also Art. 7 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S.
222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and II which
entered into force on Sept. 21 1970, Dec. 20 1971, 1 Jan. 1, 1990, and Nov. 1, 1998,
respectively. See also Yunis, supra note 19 at 1091.
31. See, e.g. the investigations in Spain into torture of detainees at Guantinamo and
elsewhere, and the continuing efforts to bring a prosecution in Germany. For Spanish
investigations, see Marlise Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era
Officials, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/world/europe/29spain.html; Spain Court Mulls U.S.
Torture Case, BBC News Americas, Mar. 29, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/7970425.stm. See Center for Constitutional Rights,
www.ccrjustice.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (the German prosecution effort).
[Vol. 17:80
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administration agree to extradite them to Spain to stand trial?
Prosecutors have proven reluctant to bring charges on these core
crimes even when they already have the defendant in custody. A case in
point is the prosecutions of some 20 Colombian paramilitary leaders on
drug trafficking charges. The paramilitaries were extradited by the
Colombian government to the U.S., and a number have already pled
guilty to trafficking and been sentenced to long prison terms.32 The only
problem is that those same paramilitary leaders were also admittedly
responsible for hundreds of killings of civilians, torture, and stealing of
the property of local peasants, leading to massive displacement. Had
they stayed in Colombia they would have participated in a process by
which they were required, in exchange for reduced sentences, to confess
their human rights-related crimes, pay restitution to victims and give
information on the structure and functioning of their operations. 34
Indeed, for many Colombian human rights groups the extraditions, even
though they will result in long prison terms, thwart the goals of the
Justice and Peace law in that they have removed all incentive for
paramilitary leaders to testify about their activities, including their links
to the ruling party and to President Alvaro Uribe.
The most likely prosecutions are likely to not involve the core
crimes but rather immigration fraud. Immigrants who enter the U.S.
under several visa statuses are asked whether they have persecuted others
or committed one of a number of violations, including "particularly
32. E.g., Plea Agreement for U.S. v. Vanoy-Rodriguez, No. 0:99-cr-06153-KMM (So.
Dist. Fla. Oct. 9, 2008). The plea agreement for the defendant includes the following
paragraph:
D. Justice and Peace
The United States and the defendant agree that nothing in this Agreement precludes the
defendant from continuing to meet his obligations under La Ley de Justicia y Paz (the Justice
& Peace law), a provision of Columbian law. The defendant acknowledges and agrees,
however, that any information he provides to the Columbian government in this regard shall
not provide a basis for a downward departure or reduction of the defendant's sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, or Title 18, United States Codes,
Section 3553(a).
Plea Agreement at 5, Vanoy-Ramirez, No. 99-06153-CR (S.D. Fla. 2008). However, nothing
in the sentence reflects this agreement. Other plea agreements and sentences contain no
mention of the Justice and Peace Law.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BREAKING THE GRIP?: OBSTACLES TO JUSTICE FOR
PARAMILITARY MAFIAS IN COLOMBIA 3 (Oct. 16 2008), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/10/16/breaking-grip-0.
34. Colombia's Justice and Peace Law, Law 975 of July 25, 2005, also know as La Ley de
Justicia y Paz, provides for reduced sentences of 5-8 years for demobilized members of armed
groups who agree to refrain from further armed activity, compensate their victims, and give a
full accounting of their crimes. Id. at 6.
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severe violations of religious freedom."3 : if they answer in the negative
and the immigration service obtains proof that they lied, that is
punishable by 5-10 years in prison. Permanent residents applying for
naturalization face similar questions, and similar penalties for lying.
As with drug trafficking charges in the Colombian case described
above, this is the "Al Capone" strategy: if it's tax evasion rather than
murder that puts the defendant in prison, does it matter? Five to ten
years in prison is a not insubstantial sentence, especially if combined
with seizure of assets and eventual deportation, but it is not as severe as
the sentences that would accompany convictions for the core crimes. On
the other hand, some of the legal and proof difficulties may be eased.
For example, participation in persecution would cover crimes, like
crimes against humanity, not now criminalized for conduct by non-
nationals outside the U.S.
On the other hand, the expressive value of punishment for visa
fraud is far different, especially in the defendant's home country, than
the value of punishment for human rights violations. The "truth-telling"
function of criminal trials, so important to victims, is lost. Plea
agreements in either drug trafficking or visa fraud cases have required
little in the way of acknowledgement of a defendant's human rights-
related crimes or reparation for those crimes. Perhaps if the U.S.
authorities were more attuned to the need for such measures in any plea
agreement, no matter what the charges, victims' groups would be less
unhappy with the "Al Capone" strategy.
In addition to the example of Salvadoran retired General Garcia,
mentioned earlier, this is the route the DOJ is taking with respect to other
accused torturers, genocidaires and terrorists. 3 6  For example, Cuban
national Luis Posada Carrilles is accused in the 1976 bombing of a
35. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 § 604, 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2008)
(established immigration restrictions for any individual who, while serving as a foreign
government official, was responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom in
the preceding 24-month period);
The Holtzman Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (Oct. 28, 2008) (states that any alien
from a Nazi-occupied country, or that of a collaborator, who "ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion" is ineligible for a U.S. visa and eligible for deportation. The law
also covers those who commit genocide, torture, or extrajudicial executions.).
36. More recently, the DOJ in September 2010 obtained the conviction of a Guatemalan
former soldier accused of participation in a massacre in 1982. Gilberto Jordan was sentenced
to ten years in prison on charges of visa fraud stemming from his non-declaration of his
participation in his citizenship application. See BBC News, "US Jails Guatemalan Ex-Soldier
for hiding massacre role," Sept. 15, 2010.
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Cubana airplane, killing 73 people, including Cubans, Venezuelans,
Surinamese and Barbadians. Venezuela indicted him for the crime, but
he escaped before trial and came to the U.S., where he filed for asylum.
He eventually became a naturalized U.S. citizen, but as the Cold War
eased he was indicted on charges of giving a false statement during
naturalization. After the federal district court dismissed those charges,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, and he is now
awaiting trial. The U.S. has said it will not extradite him to Venezuela
for fear that any trial would not meet due process standards - but then,
under the Montreal Convention on aircraft bombings, does it have an
obligation to try him for the bombing itself, and not just for the
immigration fraud? And if an admitted bomber of civilian aircraft is not
prosecuted in his U.S. home for the crime, what does that say about the
U.S. commitment to fighting terrorism more generally?
In conclusion, these five mechanisms-civil suits, prosecutions for
the core crimes, prosecutions for immigration fraud, extradition and
deportation-will continue to be used to one degree or another. The
question of how they will be combined, where the emphasis will lie, and
how the U.S. government will interact with civil society groups pursuing
human rights violators at home and abroad, can be expected to change
with the advent of a new administration. How much change, and how
fast, is still not known. In large part, decisions on how to deal with those
in the U.S. who have committed human rights-related crimes elsewhere
is inextricably linked to the issue of U.S. officials' own possible
commission of such crimes. So far, the Obama administration has
expressed little willingness to bring prosecutions. However, the
complexities of dealing with our own officials' past wrongdoing will, for
better or worse, color all efforts to deal with wrongdoers from the rest of
the world.
37. U.S. v. Posada Carriles, 486 F.Supp.2d 599 (W.D.Tex. 2007) (dismissing charges);
U.S. v. Posada Carriles, 541 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court and remanding
for trial); Carriles v. U.S. 129 S.Ct. 1657 (2009) (denying writ of certiorari).
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